In a criminal trial, evidence is used to draw conclusions about what happened concerning a supposed crime. Traditionally, the three main approaches to modeling reasoning with evidence are argumentative, narrative and probabilistic approaches. Integrating these three approaches could arguably enhance the communication between an expert and a judge or jury. In previous work, techniques were proposed to represent narratives in a Bayesian network and to use narratives as a basis for systematizing the construction of a Bayesian network for a legal (...) case. In this paper, these techniques are combined to form a design method for constructing a Bayesian network based on narratives. This design method is evaluated by means of an extensive case study concerning the notorious Dutch case of the Anjum murders. (shrink)

Historians of science have described various cases of disciplines influencing one another. Such exchanges across disciplinary boundaries often signal innovation, intellectual change, and breakthroughs. A satisfactory framework from which the historical phenomenon of epistemic transfer between disciplines can be studied systematically, however, has not yet been proposed. This essay introduces the notion of “cognitive goods,” a tool of knowledge making that can be transferred across disciplinary boundaries. Cognitive goods include, for example, methods, concepts, and instruments. The essay proposes to study (...) historical interactions between disciplines as instances of the “flow” of cognitive goods. The notion of cognitive goods may serve as a springboard for a systematic analysis of flows occurring throughout the history of the disciplines. Such an analysis could be instrumental for an integrated historiography of knowledge, including the humanities and the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

Definition of the problemFrom an ethical point of view we analyse the ruling of the German Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, G‑BA) of September 2019 to revise the guidelines about the coverage of noninvasive prenatal tests (NIPT) by mandatory health insurance, in order to include them under specified conditions. The decision contains four essential elements: a definition of the aim of NIPT testing (to avoid invasive testing), a criterion of access (test must be “necessary” for the pregnant woman to tackle (...) her individual situation), statements about the process of decision-making (after counselling by a physician and case by case) and a normative contextualization (termination of pregnancy under § 218 a German penal law) which is to be found in its explanations. There are tensions in the proposed model that oscillate about two axes: (1) The suffering that results from a possible birth of a child with trisomy or from not knowing about the genetic condition of the fetus can ultimately only be evaluated subjectively, from the perspective of the pregnant woman. (2) The meaning of an individual decision in the case-by-case model remains unclear because when judging about individual cases general points of view also need to be considered. However, we argue that the model of the G‑BA could be a sociopolitically and ultimately also ethically defensible pragmatic solution, exactly because of its paradoxes and its inherent flexibility. (shrink)

One of the most enduring criticisms of John Dewey's political thought is that it is unsuspicious of power. This essay responds to this critique by advancing the claim that power is an integral but implicit element of Dewey's conception of human experience. Given Dewey's indirect treatment of power, this essay has two primary tasks. First, it reconstructs and develops an explicit conception of power for Deweyan pragmatism. Second, it evaluates the extent that Dewey's political and social philosophy is able to (...) criticize power relations. Taken together, I aim to provide a more coherent and realistic defense of the political dimensions of Dewey's democratic theory. This defense moves Deweyan pragmatism toward a democratic politics that neither elides conflict nor evades power. (shrink)

This book investigates the extensive and growing economic inequalities that characterize the affluent market societies in which we currently live. It uses insights both from political philosophy and the new science of happiness to make the case for more just alternatives. We diagnose the damaging impact that existing inequalities have on our well-being. We draw on philosophical, psychological, social scientific and other insights to diagnose what has gone wrong in our highly unequal and frequently unhappy societies. Combining the approaches both (...) of philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, John Rawls and Philip Pettit and analyses from political economists, we uncover the economic, social and political mechanisms that create and perpetuate income and wealth inequality. The key claim is that wealthy elites engage in rent seeking and opportunity hoarding and shape our social, economic and political structures in ways that benefit them and harm the rest. We assess important insights from the new science of happiness to assess the impact of inequality on the well-being of the poor, the middle class and the rich. We specifically examine the role of key emotions, such as shame (amongst the poor), envy and admiration (towards and for the rich). We discuss which emotional narratives serve to justify and entrench excessive inequalities in income and wealth. The result is an explanation of the emotional regime that characterizes our capitalist societies and that perpetuates the unfair gap between the extravagance of the rich and the misery of the poor. We conclude with policies and proposals to re-shape this emotional regime in the interests of justice and solidarity. (shrink)

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the (...) theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. -/- He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it. (shrink)

What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p1,...,pn and q, if the conjunction of p1,..., and pn entails q, then there is a reason against a person's both believing that p1,..., and that pn and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the (...) other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if this answer is correct. (shrink)

Why law may be less important than we think.

"Pop'philosophie" : si l'on en croit la morgue méprisante que ce simple mot provoque, il s'agirait du nom d'une étrange maladie. Celle d'une philosophie se prostituant aux industries culturelles ou, pire, aux sirènes du populisme. Avec la pop' philosophie, on assisterait à la ruine de la philosophie tout court, devenue tantôt gadget pédagogique, tantôt tentative pathétique de capitaliser sur le glamour frelaté de la pop culture. Et si c'était faux? Pour Gilles Deleuze, en tout cas, rien n'était plus important que (...) l'invention d'une pop'philosophie qui sauverait la pensée de la correction professorale et de la pontification esthétique. Inventer une pensée véritablement anarchiste, enterrant la philosophie pour l'ouvrir à des devenirs inédits : tel était l'objectif qu'il donna au concept de pop'philosophie. Rien n'était moins simple ni plus ambitieux. Il est temps de comprendre en quoi."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This study explores the depictions of landscapes and emotions in the ninthcentury hagiographies associated with Liudger: the three vitae Liudgeri and Liudger’s own vita Gregorii. The Frisian missionary founded the monastery of Werden, situated near the Frankish-Saxon frontier. It will be argued that previous historiography on early medieval frontiers has predominantly focused on the military nature of frontiers. Here, more cultural or symbolic natures of the Frankish-Saxon frontier will be discussed. The hagiographical narratives will be examined in conjunction with the (...) notion of a frontier as a ‘third space’. The vitae Liudgeri shaped a discourse that legitimated Liudger’s translation to Werden. This resulted in the creation of a new place of Christian worship in the competitive landscape of post-conquest Saxony, as part of the Christianization of the region. Monasteries like Werden were the places where new missionaries were educated who would continue this Christianization. Exemplary emotional behaviour of the saints, narrated in hagiographies, could help instruct this new generation. Altfrid and Liudger tried to dissuade emotions of anger, indicated by ira or furor, with their hagiographical narratives. These two perspectives offer a glimpse into the attempts of a local monastery to stand out in the Frankish-Saxon frontier. (shrink)

Auch wenn der Tod nicht gewählt wird, wenn das Faktum des Todes unabwendbar und endgültig ist, ergeben sich für Menschen, die sich dem Sterben zuwenden, Möglichkeiten. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass der Tod in ontologischer und ethischer Hinsicht relational verstanden werden muss, legt dieses Kapitel die Bedeutung des Todes – in Anlehnung an Vladimir Jankélévitch – in der Du-Perspektive, in der Ich-Perspektive und in der dritten-Person-Perspektive aus. Für die Zurückbleibenden entsteht die Aufgabe, den Prozess des Gehen-Lassens zu begreifen und zu (...) gestalten. Eine Reihe von medizinethischen Dilemmata entstehen, die damit strukturiert werden, dass einem Sterbenden eine Rolle zugewiesen wird, die nur zu einer bestimmten Zeit gilt: wenn der Sterbeprozess begonnen hat. Wann hat er aber begonnen? Zwei soziologische Modelle der Sterberolle von 1977 und 2007 werden miteinander verglichen. Es zeigen sich Veränderungen in der Einstellung zu Sterbenden und zur Aufgabe der Medizin. Für die Sterbenden selbst entsteht die Aufgabe, die Anderen, die Welt und das ganze Leben zurückzulassen. Wünsche zum Sterben – auch eigentliche Sterbewünsche – enthalten Handlungsräume und reflektieren Verantwortung. Ein Wunsch zu sterben ist nicht einfach da oder nicht da, sondern wird gestaltet und fein austariert. Wünschen ist ein Akt des Denkens. Ein besseres Verständnis der Bedeutung von Wünschen am Lebensende kann zur Klärung der Fragen um ein „gutes Sterben“ im Kontext einer Ethik des „guten Lebens“ beitragen. (shrink)

Gricean pragmatics. Saying vs. implicating ; Discourse and cooperation ; Conversational implicatures ; Generalised vs. particularised ; Cancellability ; Gricean reasoning and the pragmatics of what is said -- The standard recipe for Q-implicatures. The standard recipe ; Inference to the best explanation ; Weak implicatures and competence ; Relevance ; Conclusion -- Scalar implicatures. Horn scales and the generative view ; Implicatures and downward entailing environments ; Disjunction : exclusivity and ignorance ; Conclusion -- Psychological plausibility. Charges of psychological (...) inadequacy ; Logical complexity ; Abduction ; Incremental processing ; The intentional stance ; Alternatives ; Conclusion -- Nonce inference or defaults?. True defaults ; Strong defaultism ; Weak defaultism ; Contextualism ; Conclusion -- Intentions, alternatives, and free choice. Free choice ; Problems with the standard recipe ; Intentions first ; Free choice explained ; Comparing alternatives ; Two flavours of Q-implicature ; Conclusion -- Embedded implicatures : the problems. The problems ; Varieties of conventionalism ; Against conventionalism ; Conclusion -- Embedded implicatures : a Gricean approach. Disjunction ; Belief reports ; Factives and other presupposition inducers ; Indefinites ; Contrastive construals and lexical pragmatics ; Conclusion. (shrink)

The competency profile underlying higher nursing education in the Netherlands states that bachelor-prepared nurses are expected to be able to participate in ethics committees. What knowledge, skills and attitudes are involved in this participation is unclear. In five consecutive years, groups of two to three fourth-year (bachelor) nursing students conducted 8 to 11 semi-structured interviews each with nurses in ethics committees. The question was what competencies these nurses themselves say they need to participate in such committees. This article reports the (...) aggregate of the 52 interviews in these five studies. Regarding knowledge, the article reports on health law, ethics and professional knowledge. Regarding skills, communication is mentioned, as are professional skills and skills for ‘doing ethics’. An open and respectful attitude towards patients and fellow committee members is required, as well as commitment to patient care, committee work and professional ethics. The right attitude for a nurse in an ethics committee is said to include a reflective and perceptive attitude, along with an awareness of one’s own limitations and convictions. A detailed competency profile for nurses’ participation in ethics committees as outlined in the recommendations may serve nursing education, institutional committees and nurses themselves to meet the demands of nurses’ preparation for clinical ethics consultations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 705-720 [Access article in PDF] On the Notion of "Disinterestedness": Kant, Lyotard, and Schopenhauer Bart Vandenabeele The strange thing, on looking back, was the purity, the integrity, of her feeling for Sally. It was not like one's feeling for a man. It was completely disinterested, and besides, it had a quality which could only exist between women, between women just (...) grown up.--Virginia Woolf, Mrs. DallowayIf the genuine aesthetic experience exists empirically--and it does--then the definition of its specific quality is at the core of any aesthetic theory that is concerned with the particularity of aesthetic appreciation. Firstly, I shall attempt to provide an acceptable interpretation of this extremely intricate issue in Kant and, moreover, question the interpretation of two philosophers--Lyotard and Schopenhauer--who both struggled with the notion of "disinterestedness" and provided a highly original (but often misunderstood) interpretation of it in their own aesthetic theories. I shall argue that Lyotard took for granted something in Kant's aesthetics that Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory tries to resolve, that is, the wide gap between the agreeable and the charming on one side, and the beautiful on the other. Kant: Disinterestedness and Existence The first moment of Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful asserts that our liking in the beautiful cannot originatefrom any interest and that in the beautiful "we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason" (§ 5, 52). 1 But Kant also insists that the liking in the beautiful does not createany interest in the object either. [End Page 705]What may this mean? As Kant asserts in the beginning of section 5, it means that "a judgment of taste is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object [indifferent in Ansehung des Daseins eines Gegenstandes]: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure [nur seine Beschaffenheit mit dem Gefühl der Lust und Unlust zusammenhält]" (§ 5, 51). The requirement that a pure judgment of taste be devoid of all interest forms the foundation of Kant's important distinction between aesthetic liking and the pleasure that may accompany moral judgment or action. 2 Kant's analysis of aesthetic response calls for another discrimination, too: the separation of aesthetic liking from mere sensory pleasure, which is the distinction that will occupy us here.Objects that arouse mere sensual pleasure, such as Belgian chocolates, are said to "gratify" (vergnügen) someone, and are then called "agreeable" (angenehm). An object "which one just likes" (was ihm bloß gefällt) is called beautiful. The incentive that corresponds to this object for thought is, respectively inclination (Neigung) or favor (Gunst). Favor, thus accorded the beautiful, is "the only free liking" (das einzige freie Wohlgefallen) (§ 5, 52). 3 Only pleasure in the beautiful is free of a connection with an interest. Both inclination and rational desire are connected with interest, and "all interest either presupposes a need [Bedürfniß] or gives rise to one; and, because interest is the basis that determines approval [als Bestimmungsgrund des Beifalls], it makes the judgment about the object unfree" (ibid.). As Paul Guyer rightly remarks, "in defining the 'quality' of aesthetic judgment Kant is not making a phenomenological distinction between different kinds of feelings of pleasure, but a distinction between the ways in which different instances of pleasure may be occasioned." 4 What Kant is suggesting is "that the presence or absence of a connection to interest may serve as a criterion for the reflective classification of given pleasures" (ibid).Section 3 aims to show that "a liking for the Agreeable is connected with Interest" (§ 3, 47). Pure favor, which is connected with the beautiful, "cannot be an inclination, or else the beautiful would be agreeable and there would be no aesthetic pleasure." 5 Kant, therefore, makes a crucial (but often overlooked) distinction between two senses of "sensation." 6 In the sense of the Critique of... (shrink)

Two computer simulations are investigated that model interaction of cultural evolution of language and biological evolution of adaptations to language. Both are agent-based models in which a population of agents imitates each other using realistic vowels. The agents evolve under selective pressure for good imitation. In one model, the evolution of the vocal tract is modeled; in the other, a cognitive mechanism for perceiving speech accurately is modeled. In both cases, biological adaptations to using and learning speech evolve, even though (...) the system of speech sounds itself changes at a more rapid time scale than biological evolution. However, the fact that the available acoustic space is used maximally is constant, and therefore biological evolution does have a stable target. This work shows that when cultural and biological traits are continuous, their co-evolution may lead to cognitive adaptations that are strong enough to detect empirically. (shrink)

According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that (...) have been made to this theory. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...) this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it. (shrink)

Positive economic models aim to provide truthful explanations of significant economic phenomena. While the notion of ‘preferences’ figures prominently in micro-economic models, it suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity and rigor. After distinguishing narrow homo economicus models from broader ones and rehearsing the criticisms both have met, I go into the most promising attempt to date at addressing them, developed by Hausman. However, his definition of preferences as ‘total comparative evaluations’, I argue, plays into the general disregard that (...) economists have for human psychology. My alternative definition of preferences as ‘overall comparative evaluations’ – and hence as one of the many factors that influence people’s behavior – allows for more adequate causal explanations of people’s dutiful, committed, and norm-guided actions. Against Hausman but in agreement with Sen, it also allows for counterpreferential choice. (shrink)

In this volume, Geurts takes discourse representation theory (DRT), and turns it into a unified account of anaphora and presupposition, which he applies not only to the standard problem cases but also to the interpretation of modal expressions, attitude reports, and proper names. The resulting theory, for all its simplicity, is without doubt the most comprehensive of its kind to date. The central idea underlying Geurts' 'binding theory' of presupposition is that anaphora is just a special case of presupposition projection. (...) But this is only one of the ways in which the concept of presupposition is taken beyond its traditional limits. Geurts shows, furthermore, that presupposition projection is crucially involved in several phenomena that are not usually viewed in presuppositional terms, such as modal subordination, de re readings of attitude reports, and rigid designation. While making his case for DRT and the binding theory, Geurts also presents an incisive analysis of what is probably still the most influential account of presupposition, viz. the satisfaction theory, demonstrating that there are fundamental problems not only with this theory but with the very framework in which it is couched. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay examines the role that entomological workers played in U.S. public health efforts during the construction of the Panama Canal (1904–1914). Entomological workers were critical to mosquito control efforts aimed at the reduction of tropical fevers such as malaria. But in the process of studying vector mosquitoes, they discovered that many of the conditions that produced mosquitoes were not intrinsic to tropical nature per se but resulted from the human‐caused environmental disturbances that accompanied canal building. This realization did (...) not mesh well with an American ideology of tropical triumphalism premised on the notion that the Americans had conquered unalloyed tropical nature in Panama. The result, however, was not a coherent counternarrative but a set of intra‐administrative tensions over what controlling nature meant in Panama. Ultimately, entomological workers were loyal not just to the U.S. imperial mission in Panama but also to a modernist culture of science and to the workings of mosquito ecology as they understood them. (shrink)

The concept of resistance has always been central to the reception of Hegel's philosophy. The prevalent image of Hegel's system, which continues to influence the scholarship to this day, is that of an absolutist, monist metaphysics which overcomes all resistance, sublating or assimilating all differences into a single organic 'Whole'. For that reason, the reception of Hegel has always been marked by the question of how to resist Hegel: how to think that which remains outside of or other to the (...) totalizing system of dialectics. In recent years the work of scholars such as Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek, Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda has brought considerable nuance to this debate. A new reading of Hegel has emerged which challenges the idea that there is no place for difference, otherness or resistance in Hegel, both by refusing to reduce Hegel's complex philosophy to a straightforward systematic narrative and by highlighting particular moments within Hegel's philosophy which seem to counteract the traditional understanding of dialectics. This book brings together established and new voices in this field in order to show that the notion of resistance is central to this revaluation of Hegel. (shrink)

'Tu m'as déçu!' Qui, aujourd'hui, pourrait se relever d'une telle accusation? Et qui, aussi, n'y a jamais recouru? Nous sommes les êtres de la déception, car nous ne cessons de décevoir et d'être déçu. Pourtant, les moralistes l'ont martelé : être déçu, c'est avant tout être la victime d'attentes qui n'existaient que dans notre tête. Mais si ce n'était pas tout? Et si, derrière la fable morale, se dissimulait toute une politique, une théologie et même une métaphysique? Et si, derrière (...) la danse de l'espoir et de la déception, des attentes et de leur frustration, se déployait un véritable ordre du monde, décidant, pour nous, de ce que nous pouvons et ne pouvons pas? Et si décevoir était avant tout une manière de s'y soustraire? Poursuivant son travail de décadrage des grands concepts issus de la modernité, Laurent de Sutter ajoute un chapitre jouissif au chantier de ses Propositions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Linguistic research has revealed several pathways of language change that may guide our understanding of the evolution of mental‐state attribution. In particular, it turns out that, in many languages, quotative verbs have been exapted for attributing a variety of mental states, including beliefs and intentions. In such languages, the literal translation of, “Betty said: ‘There will be war’”, may be used not only to quote Betty's words, but also to convey that she thought or intended there to be war. This (...) paper presents a model of the pragmatic shifts underlying this pathway, and proposes an evolutionary trajectory from quotation to the public practice of attributing beliefs and intentions, and thence to implicit belief/intention attribution. (shrink)

Dewey famously argues that the end of education is growth. This basic idea, widely criticized and often misunderstood, rests on a series of more complex arguments about the nature of education, human experience, and social life. First, Dewey understands education as the reconstruction of experience. As such, there is an intimate and inextricable relation between a person’s life experiences on one side and educational methods, content, and ends on the other. We learn by gaining a better sense of the meaning (...) of present experiences and by increasing our ability to direct future experiences (MW 9: 83). Second, we grow when learning opens up opportunities for future growth and thereby enables us to continue our .. (shrink)

Health-promoting nudges have been put into practice by different agents, in different contexts and with different aims. This article formulates a set of criteria that enables a thorough ethical evaluation of such nudges. As such, it bridges the gap between the abstract, theoretical debates among academics and the actual behavioral interventions being implemented in practice. The criteria are derived from arguments against nudges, which allegedly disrespect nudgees, as these would impose values on nudgees and/or violate their rationality and autonomy. Instead (...) of interpreting these objections as knock-down arguments, I take them as expressing legitimate worries that can often be addressed. I analyze six prototypical nudge cases, such as Google’s rearrangement of fridges and the use of defaults in organ donation registration. I show how the ethical criteria listed are satisfied by most—but not all—nudges in most—but not all—circumstances. (shrink)

Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.